1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	HOCHUL ET AL. Appellants,
5	-against- NO. 60 HARKENRIDER ET AL., Respondents.
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7	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York April 26, 2022
8	Before:
9	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
10	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
10	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
11	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
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1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good morning, everyone.
2	Judge Rivera is participating remotely in oral argument.
3	This is appeal number 60, Harkenrider v. Hochul.
4	Counsel?
5	MR. BUCKI: Good morning, Madam Chief Judge and
6	members of this honorable court. My name is Craig Bucki
7	from the Law Firm of Phillips Lytle in Buffalo, New York,
8	on behalf of Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie.
9	Before I begin, I would like to request two
LO	minutes for the purpose of rebuttal.
L1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have two minutes.
L2	And let's start here, counsel. We do have an affirmed
L3	finding from the Appellate Division below. What is the
L4	standard of review, sir?
L5	MR. BUCKI: The standard of review is that the
L6	petitioners needed to prove their case beyond a reasonable
L7	doubt. And this is the standard that was upheld only
L8	thirty five days ago by this court in White v. Cuomo, and
L9	in particular, what I would note is that this is more than
20	a case about redistricting
21	JUDGE GARCIA: But counsel, counsel I'm
22	sorry to interrupt you
23	MR. BUCKI: Yes.
24	JUDGE GARCIA: but that's the standard of
5	proof I think what the Chief Judge is saying here is we

now have affirmed findings of fact in this record. So what's our standard for reviewing affirmed findings of fact?

MR. BUCKI: Well, this - - - the Court of Appeals is a court that reviews findings of law rather than findings of fact, but what we would submit is that what the court needs to answer is whether the evidence was sufficient enough in order to support the findings.

JUDGE GARCIA: So a legal sufficiency?

MR. BUCKI: Legal sufficiency.

JUDGE GARCIA: But on that standard, aren't the petitioners then entitled, at this stage of litigation, to every fair inference that can be drawn?

MR. BUCKI: And I would say, Judge Garcia, I would emphasize the word fair, in terms of fair inference. And so, one good example is - - and I'm - - and what I'd like to refer to is the majority opinion, the plurality opinion, wherein it was inferred, and inference was the word that they used, that because it was only Democrats who voted in favor of the congressional plan that therefore, it must have been for some partisan purpose. We would submit that that is not a fair inference because it can also be inferred that rather this is a circumstance where people in the legislative minority - - - the Republican minority, they had three days under the bill aging process to propose

amendments. They had an opportunity to engage in substantive input. And in fact the record demonstrates that Republican input was considered.

And what I would commend the Court to is pages 3263 to 3265 of the record, because we have in the record the maps that came from the Independent Redistricting Commission, the first go-around when they actually did produce maps - - and what one will find, for example, is that in looking at the various communities of interest and in order to try to keep them together, concerning the upstate map, they decided that there should be a metro Buffalo district, there should be a metro Rochester district, that metro Syracuse should be included with Tompkins County because those are the two college towns with Ithaca and Syracuse, and metro Albany should have a district.

And there was marked similarity between and among the plans. And in fact Justice Lindley noted that at his oral argument, but yet the plurality threw out the baby with the bathwater, so to speak, and said, we're going to invalidate the entire map.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, are communities of interest analogous to geographic locations? You just spoke about Albany, Schenectady, Rochester. Is that what it means, or is it broader than that?



MR. BUCKI: It's - - - it's broader than that. It can mean geography, but it also can mean communities of interest in terms of religion; it can mean communities of interest in terms of language; it can mean communities of interest in terms of ethnicity. And a very good example is what happened with respect to the map as drawn in District number 11, the Staten Island district, so to speak. surrounding that Staten Island district the decision was made, in order to account for the fact that there is a burgeoning Asian-American population in Brooklyn, in Bensonhurst and Bath Beach, that pursuant to the - - - the testimony of Dr. Wah Lee from the organization of Chinese-Americans of New York City, that the Chinatown of Manhattan and the Chinatown of Brooklyn should be united in a single district. And so -JUDGE CANNATARO: So it could be ethnicities as well?

MR. BUCKI: Yes.

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JUDGE CANNATARO: I see.

MR. BUCKI: Absolutely.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So if you - - - if you want to follow that exhortation in the - - - in the Constitution, I think it's to try to maintain communities of interest. I'm not sure, you can correct me on that, but does that have to yield to - - - to other commands such as compactness and,

you know, contiguousness and things like that? 1 MR. BUCKI: Well, contiguity is an absolute must. 2 3 It - - - it is impossible to have districts that are not 4 contiguous. But aside from that, we would submit that the 5 appropriate metaphor to use in this circumstance is the 6 metaphor of a scale. And we don't have a typical scale 7 with one side and another side like in a science class. 8 This is a scale with multiple sides to it. 9 And it's the duty of the legislature to decide 10 how to balance all of these required criteria that they need to consider - - - how to balance, for example, keeping 11 12 communities of interest together, how to balance 13 maintaining the cores of preexisting districts, how to 14 balance keeping counties and cities together and - - - and 15 honoring the jurisdictional splits. And - - -16 JUDGE WILSON: Well, it was the duty of the IRC, 17 right? Initially, at least, not the legislature. 18 MR. BUCKI: Initially it was the duty, we would 19 submit - - -20 JUDGE WILSON: And so they didn't do their duty? Or did they? 21 22 MR. BUCKI: They did not do their job. 23 their job the first time around, in terms of - - -24 JUDGE WILSON: So, in your view, it was okay to

submit two competing plans that complied with their duty?

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MR. BUCKI: Yes. If that's what they wanted to do, we certainly have no problem with that. Both of those plans were rejected, and so then it went back to the Independent Redistricting Commission to produce a new map, which they did not do. And we would submit that a fortiori the legislature retains all of the prerogative that it had. JUDGE WILSON: So - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel. Counsel. If I can ask -

- - I'm on the screen.

MR. BUCKI: Yes, Judge.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Let me - - - let me just follow through on this question on this point you're making. I understand it fully, and I appreciate the constitutional foundation for the argument you've just made. But why isn't it - - - why isn't it also appropriate to say the IRC could have fulfilled its duties under the Constitution because it submitted two maps? That's what it did.

And then the legislature could have assumed that that's all they had. Could have treated it as a constructive submission the second time around, when they didn't give anything else, because they've already given the two maps. They're deadlocked.

MR. BUCKI: I think that's a salient argument, and that argument could be made. I mean, it hasn't been made before by the parties, but we would certainly



1	recognize the wisdom of that argument.
2	JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, in that scenario, which
3	map would you would you consider the first submitted
4	and which would you consider the second?
5	MR. BUCKI: Well, they were submitted
6	simultaneously. And so, the way the way it happened
7	was
8	JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, the constitutional
9	amendment lays out dates and deadlines and
10	MR. BUCKI: It does.
11	JUDGE CANNATARO: so I'm just trying to
12	figure out if we if we go down that road, do we take
13	the Democratic map first and then consider the Republican
14	after, or vice versa?
15	MR. BUCKI: Well, that's probably a metaphysical
16	question because they were submitted at the same time.
17	But
18	JUDGE CANNATARO: And both rejected?
19	MR. BUCKI: And both were rejected, yes.
20	JUDGE GARCIA: But counsel, following up on Judge
21	Rivera's point, you could have the legislature could
22	have done that. They could have accepted it your
23	initial two plans as the second submission and applied a
24	two percent rule to those plans for amendments, and they

didn't do that. They did something very, very different.

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And isn't that evidence of a purpose to gerrymander?

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MR. BUCKI: No. Not - - - not at all. and the reason for that is that, you know, purpose suggests some kind of intent. And the other states that have been talked about in this litigation, Ohio, Florida, Pennsylvania, we have seen evidence of what qualifies in order to satisfy a purpose to favor or disfavor a political party.

There's usually a partisan symmetry analysis, for Sometimes, as in Ohio, you have direct evidence. example. You know, in the state of Pennsylvania, also there was a very robust compactness analysis as opposed to what we here - - - had here from Mr. Trende where he can only use one compactness metric; otherwise, his program wouldn't necessarily work. And so - - - and, in fact, I would commend the Court to Mr. Hecker's letter submission that goes through all of these ways that purpose could have been established.

And so all we have here are, number one, what the plurality said is the fact that this map was only adopted by Democrats, without Republican votes. Number two, they make an inference that in fact there was no Republican input at all, which is not true based upon what's in the record from the commission. And then they go to the simulations of Mr. Trende, and those simulations are

extremely flawed in terms of their problems with redundancy, the problems with the lack of an appropriate sample size, the problems with the lack of an appropriate analysis that's not nearly as robust as the analysis he was doing at the same time in the state of Maryland - - - JUDGE RIVERA: So - - so, Counsel, let me ask

you - - - so, Counsel, let me ask

MR. BUCKI: Yes.

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm on the screen. Those - - those points that you're making about the deficiencies, is
what you see as the deficiencies of the Trende analysis,
why doesn't that go to the weight and apropos of the
questions that were asked by members of the bench before?
Why isn't that sort of findings of fact that we can't get
into?

MR. BUCKI: We would say, to quote the dissent from Justice Whalen, that this is not a case where one would have a battle of the experts, so to speak. This isn't a situation where Mr. Trende has some simulations, and respondents' experts have some simulations, and it's a matter of evaluating which simulations might happen to be right. Mr. Trende's simulations are the simulations, and respondents did not use their own simulation method because we would submit we didn't have the burden to do that.

And so the questions remains, with respect to Mr.



Trende's analysis, was that enough? Was that legally
sufficient? Because we don't have a battle of the experts,
all we have is Mr. Trende, and we would submit that the
sufficiency simply is not there to overturn the reasoned
judgement of the legislature, which as this Court
said only thirty five days ago, that the Court is cognizant
of in order to maintain the distribution of powers that
render it improper for courts to lightly disregard the
considered judgement of a legislative body that this
that is also charged with a duty to uphold the
Constitution. And in fact, as the dissent noted, it is a
pretty far leap to say that the legislature, based on some
inference, must be presumed to have been derelict in
satisfying its constitutional responsibility. And we would
submit that the the landscape of the law has not
changed in thirty five days, nor should it change.
CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

Counsel?

MR. HECKER: Good morning, everyone. May it please the Court, Eric Hecker from Cuti Hecker Wang. I too would like to reserve two minutes, with the Court's permission.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may have two minutes, sir.

MR. HECKER: Your Honor, the standard of review



1 is de novo, and that's because the question before the 2 Court is whether a statewide statute is unconstitutional. 3 By definition that presents a legal question that this 4 Court does not show deference to. 5 JUDGE CANNATARO: Wouldn't that be the standard 6 of review for a direct appeal, whereas in this case we have 7 an intermediate appellate court reviewing findings of fact? 8 MR. HECKER: I don't think so, Your Honor. 9 Either way, the question is whether the statute's 10 unconstitutional, which presents a question of law. And to be sure, some questions of law are what we call pure 11 12 questions, and some have factual issues embedded in them, 13 not unlike the Court's gambling case from a few weeks ago. 14 But the fact that there may be - - - I mean, it's not like 15 the question is whether the light was red or green, and 16 five witnesses said it was red and three said it was green 17 and one was wearing their glasses and the other had a drink 18 19 JUDGE CANNATARO: No, the question is whether the 20 legislature acted with partisan intent or not. 21 MR. HECKER: Correct. 22 JUDGE CANNATARO: And intent is a 23 quintessentially factual question.

context, for sure. In this context, it drives the legal

In - - - in - - - in a different

MR. HECKER:

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question of whether the statute is unconstitutional.

Either way, there really is no persuasive evidence, on any standard, that could carry their heavy burden here in concluding that intent.

And I'd like to take head-on the Appellate
Division's statement on page 7 of its decision, that it is
implausible, even if it accepts, which the plurality seem
to be taking steps towards accepting, that the first four
bands to the left of Mr. Trende's dot plots show a space
between the enacted plan and the simulated bands, precisely
because he ignored, and in fact wasn't even aware of, the
strong bipartisan consensus on the commission that the
legislature heeded about how to draw upstate.

The critical point is that the very same problem plagues the next nine columns to the right, in the so-called competitive Democratic districts. What - - - the districts that we're talking about there are districts like Albany, Rochester, Syracuse, the upstate urban areas that Mr. Trende didn't even know and ignored, that the commission, Republicans and Democrats alike, had decided to draw bluer than Mr. Trende's simulations did starting from a blank page, not to make them blue, because one of the many ways to acknowledge and heed a community of interest is to talk about keeping an urban population - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But Counsel - - - I'm on the



1 screen - - - but Counsel, I understand this argument you're 2 making, and it's certainly a compelling argument about 3 the - - - the benefits of the IRC process. But what's 4 challenged is the legislatively drawn maps, and what the 5 legislature adopted, which was not what the IRC proposed in 6 either of the plans. 7 So isn't the question really just about what the 8 legislature did not - - - not what the - - - there were 9 some parts of the plan that even Republicans would find 10 appropriate. 11 I appreciate the question, Your MR. HECKER: 12 Honor, and this to me goes back to one of Judge Garcia's 13 questions where he suggested that what the legislature did 14 was very different. And I would respectfully disagree. 15 There was no consensus, Judge Garcia, about downstate at 16 all. And there was a very clear consensus about 17 upstate - - -18 JUDGE GARCIA: But my point - - -MR. HECKER: - - - and what the legislature 19 20 did - - -21 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - my point's on - - -22 MR. HECKER: - - - closely hewed to that. 23 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - my point on that wasn't to 24 get into the details of the map, and there are arguments on

the sides of the map and the expert testimony. My point in

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that questioning was we need to look at, I think, what the process was - - - we can all agree, I think all agree, that the IRC process broke down. They didn't do their job, or however you want to phrase it. And then it went to the legislature. And what did the legislature do? So there were a number of options open.

They could have, I think as Judge Rivera suggested, taken one of the two plans that had already been submitted and substantially complied with the process, I think at that time, by applying the two percent rule that was in effect by their own legislation. But they didn't. They didn't do that.

They did a number of other things. So one thing they was did was propose a constitutional amendment, passed entirely along partisan lines, that would have given them plenary authority, apparently they already claimed they have, and rid - - and gotten rid of some of the super majority requirements for one party rule.

That didn't pass. They passed a law to get rid of the two percent, notwithstanding, so the two percent didn't apply, and they came up with their own plan in a process that didn't involve the other political side. It was a partisan process.

Again, I'm not saying any of that violated, per se, a rule. But if we're looking at purpose, don't we look



at that track record?

MR. HECKER: In part, Your Honor. But what got buried in there is looking at the map. And what's what the - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But you do look at the map. And that's part of the evidence of purpose. But I think as the Florida court made clear, our statute isn't an effect - - - our constitutional provision isn't an effect statute or constitutional provision. It's a purpose provision.

So what we're looking at is motive. An effect is circumstantial evidence of motive, but so is action. And the actions the legislature took, I would suggest also speak to motive here.

MR. HECKER: For sure, Your Honor, and if I could address both the process and the map. The process that was followed here is a far, far cry from what happened in Florida, where you had outside political operatives hired to engage in sham proceedings and to destroy material evidence. We don't have anything within a mile of that here.

JUDGE GARCIA: Do we know what the process was here? I looked in the record, and I saw no discovery in terms of what actually happened in drafting the maps.

MR. HECKER: We produced discovery. That's not in the appellate record, but it's in the discovery record



showing that there were no outside political consultants and the map was drafted by legislatures and their staffs.

Even if you could infer some, some basis to divine intent from the fact that with only a month to go before the petitioning period and with a fully developed record already voluminously prepared and transmitted by the IRC, and more than enough votes to meet the constitutionally prescribed threshold to act, that the legislature acted - - even if you could - - even if you could infer something from that, you have to get to the map, Your Honor.

This would be the first court, in any of these cases, to strike down a redistricting plan without doing a district-by-district analysis of what the supposed problem is. They chose to proceed the way they chose to proceed. They put all their eggs in the basket of Sean Trende, whose bands don't make any sense because he didn't take into account communities of interest, and Mr. Lavigna, a gentleman who was so wrong about everything he's become a ghost in this case.

And there's nothing left. And so if Your Honor is put off by the process more than I am, I would - - - I would respectfully suggest there's just not anywhere near enough to get them beyond a reasonable doubt.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.



MR. HECKER: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MR. LANG: Thank you, Your Honor. Jeffrey Lang on behalf of the Governor. I'd like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Of course, sir.

MR. LANG: I'd like to address first the standard of review. I agree with my senate colleague that the standard is de novo, and the reason for that is that I don't think what happened here is properly considered an affirmed finding of fact. It is true that there were facts that were relevant to the overall, you know, determination.

But the determination was a legal one which was the declaration by a court that these electoral maps were invalid. I mean, it's certainly true in other cases, for example, the intent of the legislature can be relevant to whether a law is constitutional if it's passed with religions animus or if a law is passed with discriminatory intent.

So, you know, that is an intent issue, but that doesn't render - - and there could be facts that are relevant to that to deciding that issue, but that doesn't render the overall conclusion a factual one. So I think what happened here is - - is best considered an - - an affirmed conclusion of law that this Court can review. And

I would also ask - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, Counsel. Can I ask - - - can I - - I'm on the screen. I just want to tease this out a little bit. Are you in part arguing that, regardless of the intent, the bottom line is if the district lines are not gerrymandered, you don't have an unconstitutional redistricting? You don't have the apportionment, the lines are not unconstitutional, because what the Constitution prohibits is an attempt to do that. And if you didn't succeed in that, you haven't violated the Constitution? Or have I misunderstood your argument?

MR. LANG: No, I - - - I agree that intent is the issue. All I'm suggesting is that what's really important is the context in which that finding's being made and the context, just like as one could find a discriminatory intent in passing a law or - - or passing a law with religious animus. And I don't think this Court would say, well, we don't have jurisdiction to review that issue because that's a factual issue.

JUDGE RIVERA: All - - - all I'm saying is that if - - - if one looks at the - - - at the lines and concludes they're not actually gerrymandered, that is to say that they don't favor or undermine a political candidate or party, right, that - - - that you couldn't then find intent to do that, I mean, if you don't have

1 that. Or again, and I misunderstanding the point? 2 MR. LANG: I think if Your Honor - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: I just want to understand if 4 that's in part your point. 5 MR. LANG: An intent that wasn't realized, it's 6 hard to imagine how something like that could happen in 7 this context. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: I - - - I agree, which is why I 9 think you always track back to looking at the district 10 lines themselves. 11 MR. LANG: You agree - - -12 JUDGE RIVERA: I guess I'm asking you if your 13 argument is in part that the - - - the best evidence of 14 intent is how the lines are actually drawn. There may be 15 other evidence, but that alone would never carry the day, 16 unless you can show that the lines themselves end up with a 17 gerrymander. 18 MR. LANG: I think that's right. I mean, a key 19 evidence are the lines themselves. And I - - - you know, I 20 don't think the circumstantial - - - you could call it 21 circumstantial evidence, I don't think it amounts to 22 anything - - -23 JUDGE GARCIA: Now, Counsel, but the - - - the 24 Constitution reads purpose. Right, so I agree effect is 25 very strong evidence of purpose, but it's not necessary

evidence. Let's say we had a racial gerrymandering case and we had statements - - - very offensive statements made - - I don't say that this is this case, but - - - and - - and that clearly indicated a purpose to marginalize certain voters. Would you say in that case, well, look at the map; the map's okay. Like, it didn't do that. It didn't - - so even though, you know, you have a lot of these statements and you have some other smoke around the process, but no, it's okay, because look at the map. The map's okay.

MR. LANG: Sorry. I didn't mean to suggest the map would be dispositive if you had statements like that. And I think Your Honor's question points up exactly why this case was so weak on the congressional gerrymanders that, you know, all of the evidence was - - - you know, their - - the expert that they used at trial. I don't think the fact that, you know, that the process didn't involve the Republican minority party really amounts to anything. I mean, that is - - - that is simply not required by the Constitution.

JUDGE GARCIA: But you - - - you know our case law well. And we've said when we look at the Constitution and its provisions, we construct it the way we would a statute. But in this case, with a constitutional provision, we're looking at the intention of the people,

not the intention of the legislature. So we have two kind of different things going here. I think intent in terms of purpose to gerrymander, but intent in terms of what did the people think they were enacting.

And if I look at the language that's on that ballot that says, you know, this is a process that provides the legislature may only amend the redistricting plan according to established principles if the commission's plan is rejected twice by the legislature. That to me tells me the people of New York, when they voted for this commission, were under that impression, and that at the time, those established principles including a statute that said that even if you reject it twice, we're going to apply two percent rule for any amendments. And then they hear no, no, we have plenary authority.

And I just ask you, do you think as we look at what was the intention of the people of the state of New York when they voted this provision in - - was it that?

MR. LANG: Well, I have a different view of that language, which is that what it shows is that, like the constitutional drafters, the people simply did not anticipate the type of issue that we had here, which is where the IRC deadlocked the second time around and then failed to submit a second set of maps. And, you know, I would also add that if four of - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So if there is - - - with the failure with the second round, what is the remedy? If - - if the procedure failed, as the people had envisioned, what is the remedy?

MR. LANG: Well, the remedy is that consistent with the legislature's historic authority over redistricting, and consistent with the constitutional provision that allows the legislature a full and reasonable opportunity to cure when there's a legal infirmity, the legislature properly stepped in - - and that's according to the 2021 legislation that was passed to fill precisely this silence in the constitutional procedures.

JUDGE GARCIA: Do you know of any other law,

Counsel, that says if a certain officer or a certain person

mandated with a duty under the state Constitution fails to

perform that duty, we're going to do X? Is there any other

example of a statute like that? Because isn't that a way

to say, well, if you don't do this, then, like, you know,

we'll do it. So this is such a different incentive here.

MR. LANG: Well, I can't think of another statute, but what I think is important to bear in mind is that someone has to pass the maps. Right? There's no choice. Someone has to pass the maps - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: The person - - - the person - - - well, group that is charged under the state Constitution

has to do that. I mean, you're saying, like, okay, but if you don't, someone else will do it. And I don't know of any other law that I read that way.

MR. LANG: Well - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: If you don't fulfill your constitutional duty mandated, shall, mandated by the Constitution of the state, well, we'll do it.

MR. LANG: Well, I think it's just an example - - the legislature foresaw this problem, and so it devised a
remedy. And again, so the question is who is going to
remedy the problems? Would it be the legislature or the
courts? And I think if you accept - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, Counsel, in Section 4(e) it certainly contemplates at least the court having a role. It talks about the court stepping in to remedy defects. So I guess it raises the question of, are we bound by the legislature's choice that they are the correct person to remedy - - or the correct entity to remedy the defect? Or should we look to the language of the Constitution and recognize that the courts might have a role to play here too?

MR. LANG: Well, the courts can certainly remedy a defect, but, again, in Section 5 the legislature has to be given a full opportunity when there is a legal infirmity in the map. And again, what happened here, and I think



this is - - - this context is very important because what happened was the IRC didn't have a quorum because four members refused to meet with the rest of the IRC. So again, four judges - - - four of the five judges of the Appellate Division actually rejected this argument. And so if - - - if - - - if the - - - the minority group among the ten-member commission could wrest this entire process away from the legislature and displace it onto the courts - - - again, that assumes someone has a lawsuit - - - maybe there are multiple lawsuits and then multiple maps being drawn by courts, and then how is that resolved. So that - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, if I can ask you - - - I'm on the screen. I'll ask the same question I asked the first lawyer. What - - - why - - - I'm - - - I'm having trouble seeing this as a - - - a - - - a true failure under the Constitution. Obviously, the IRC had an opportunity under the Constitution to label something as another redistricting plan. They could have submitted either or both of the first two they submitted again. They didn't do that.

But as I read the Constitution, if the - - - if
the first - - - if one plan that's submitted is not adopted
by the legislature, the IRC has, under the Constitution,
the right to submit another one. So the legislature would
have two plans before it.

The legislature had two plans before it. It didn't adopt either. The Constitution is very clear that the IRC plans are not mandated to be approved. It's for the legislature to reject or accept. And once they've gotten two plans - - in many ways one can say is exactly what the Constitution anticipated - - if the first one is not accepted, the legislature acted.

I want to be clear. My argument has - - - has nothing to do with the redistricting act and the two percent that Judge Garcia refers to. I'm talking strictly about the language in the Constitution and that process.

I'm not talking about a statute. I'm talking about the Constitution only. And I'm having difficulty seeing why the legislature could not, having had these two plans, move forward in accordance with 4(b). Since when they deadlock on the first plan and they can submit the two highest votegathering - - or as many vote-gathering plans as they have, as they did, you just track back to 4(b).

MR. LANG: Well, I suppose that that is a possible argument. I mean, I think what was contemplated is that the IRC would submit a first set, either one or more competing plans. The legislature was then free to accept or reject them. And if it rejects them, then the ball goes back to the IRC's court to submit a second set, and that set - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but I think that in part
2	- but I think that, in part, is an optimistic view of what
3	the IRC could do. And here the IRC is deadlocked, isn't
4	going to move from that, but it does present two plans.
5	And I don't see why, then, that is not enough under the
6	Constitution for the legislature to move forward, since
7	- since the legislature doesn't have to accept any of it.
8	I mean, it's sort of in some way it's a nice theory,
9	but they don't have to accept any of it.
10	MR. LANG: Well, all I can say is I believe that
11	the legislature was with it because the legislature has the
12	ability to accept or reject for any reason the two sets of
13	plans, that the legislature acted well within its rights
14	and consistent with the 2021 legislation in filling in what
15	I think is a gap here to act when the IRC wasn't
16	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
17	MR. LANG: able to form a quorum and even
18	submit a second set of of competing maps
19	JUDGE WILSON: Is it is it a possible
20	remedy to send this back to the IRC, to compel them to do
21	what you say and I think Judge Garcia thinks the people
22	understood they should have done?
23	MR. LANG: Well, I think the the if -
24	if the Court does find a violation, I think the proper
25	remedy would be to send it back to, you know to send

the - - - on - - - on the procedural issue, I suppose the proper remedy would be to send the - - - send it back to the legislature. Because under Section 5, whenever any map redistricting plan is declared invalid, the legislature shall have a full and reasonable opportunity to cure the infirmity if the map wasn't enacted pursuant to the proper constitutional procedures and the 2021 legislation is invalid, then the legislature should have an opportunity to cure. Maybe that would involve going back to the IRC; I'm not sure, but again, I don't think there was a constitutional violation - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but if the - -
Counsel, but if - - - if - - - if the infirmity is solely

one of - - - let's assume for one moment, of procedure,

that the IRC didn't, within the timeframe set out in the

Constitution, submit quote unquote a second redistricting

plan and if necessary a - - - implementing legislation in

accordance with that particular plan, the only entity that

can cure that is the IRC. If the conclusion is - - - the

IRC has to do that. Legislature can't act until the IRC

does that. What - - - what is sending it back to the

legislature have to do with it?

MR. LANG: If --- if --- if the conclusion is that the IRC has to act, then it needs to be sent back to the IRC. I don't think that's the proper conclusion to



draw from what happened here. And I do think there's a big difference - - - when the procedures break down, if it's the fault of the legislature, the legislature deadlocks, then maybe it doesn't make sense to send it back to the legislature.

But here, everyone agrees it was not the fault of the legislature. The IRC deadlocked because it couldn't form a quorum. And in that circumstances, it doesn't seem to me to make a lot of sense to say, well, then the legislature for the entire ten year redistricting cycle has forfeited its ability to draw maps and our only remedy is to have a court enact the maps.

JUDGE SINGAS: Well, what - - -

MR. LANG: That would be - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: - - - what would be the remedy,
Counselor, if there's a substantive violation, if it's
determined that there was a gerrymandering? Does it go
back to the leg then?

MR. LANG: It - - it absolutely goes back to the legislature if - - if this Court were to affirm and find that there was a substantive gerrymander - - we disagree with that, but if this Court were to affirm, then the legislature should have a full and reasonable opportunity, and we would ask for additional time beyond the April 30th deadline that the Appellate Division set for

the legislature to cure, and that's in Section 5 in the state Constitution.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, one - - - one quick question, I'm - - I'm sorry. Would it be - - - would it be a full and fair opportunity to give the legislature the opportunity to submit its own proposed map to a special master to remedy whatever the problem is that is found in the event of substantive unconstitutionality?

MR. LANG: I think the remedy would be a full and reasonable opportunity to enact a new map that would then be subject to review by Supreme Court.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So we have to start the whole process from the beginning?

MR. LANG: Yes. And I believe that's a - - - a reason why a remedy should not be implemented in this election cycle. The election has simply proceeded too far down the road. So if this Court finds a violation, either on the substantive point or in the procedures, then it should lift the cloud of uncertainty that currently hangs over the election. There - - - there's a June 28 primary coming up. The designating petition period has already concluded, and it should declare that any remedy - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But Counsel, doesn't that incentivize what happened here? Especially for those who might want the kind of outcome that they think they find in



the - - - in the lines as they were drawn?

MR. LANG: It - - - it - - - it does not. And I believe there are three reasons why. And I know petitioners have argued that it does. I - - - I don't think you can say, well, we just can't trust the legislature because if they have one free pass, they will, you know, gerrymander to their hearts' content and know they can always get their incumbents in. And I - - - I don't believe that's correct.

If there were an egregious gerrymander, a party could get preliminary relief. In fact, petitioners here asked the trial court to halt the designating petition process. The trial court declined to do that. And as a result of that and in reliance on that ruling, the election has now gone forward. So that's not necessarily going to be the case in all elections.

Again, we seriously disagree with the proposition that this was an egregious gerrymander. We don't believe it was a gerrymander at all. But in a different case, you could get preliminary relief. If you had a more limited challenge with only a small number of districts, it would be easier to implement a remedy.

And finally, and maybe most importantly, the legislature is entitled to the presumption of good faith.

I don't think you can simply assume that legislatures - - -

1	that the legislature will manipulate the state
2	constitutional process in order to enact a gerrymander.
3	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.
4	Counsel?
5	MR. TSEYTLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Misha
6	Tseytlin for the petitioners. I would also ask for two
7	minutes of rebuttal.
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: On your your cross-
9	appellant on your cross-appeal, you'll get your
10	rebuttal time.
11	MR. TSEYTLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
12	In 2014 the people set up an exclusive process
13	for how all redistricting maps would be enacted in the
14	state. They also set up the strongest language prohibitin
15	partisan gerrymandering found in any constitution in the
16	United States.
17	Yet in the very first redistricting cycle where
18	this was relevant, the legislature ignored the IRC process
19	enacted a map as if that process wasn't
20	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Well, in this particular
21	the IRC process did begin, correct?
22	MR. TSEYTLIN: That is correct, Your Honor.
23	JUDGE TROUTMAN: But there was a breakdown?
24	MR. TSEYTLIN: That's right. The process failed
25	and there was a violation of law

1	JUDGE TROUTMAN: So is that the I the
2	failure of the IRC or the failure of the legislature, at
3	that point?
4	MR. TSEYTLIN: Well, the IRC violated the law,
5	and then the legislature attempted to take a step that it
6	had no legal authority to take. The consequence
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Could Counsel I'm on
8	the screen. So could petitioners, or anyone else, have
9	sued the IRC, if the IRC is the entity in your view that
10	has failed to comply with its constitutional duty?
11	MR. TSEYTLIN: We could have, but the
12	Constitution provides an exclusive provides what
13	happens when there's a violation of law by the IRC. It's
14	right there in the same provision. It says this will be
15	the exclusive process. It says this will be the exclusive
16	process except that a court shall take a particular kind of
17	remedy. And it's very important to read the
18	Constitution
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but why isn't that remedy to
20	require the IRC to comply with its duty? Why not just sue
21	the IRC, if that's the error? Before you even get to the
22	legislature passing any maps that you claim are
23	unconstitutional, right?
24	MR. TSEYTLIN: Your Honor, the legislature had no
25	authority to pass any maps, so the Constitution provides

that a court is required to order the adoption or change to a redistricting plan as a remedy followed by a violation of law. The Constitution tells us what the remedy is for the violation.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, but what I'm saying is that the - - - the Court's remedy for the - - - for this particular error - - - I know you have another one on the merits of the - - - of the actual lines drawn by the legislature. I'm not talking about that. For this particular error, which is - - - or procedural defectiveness you point to, that - - - that falls on the shoulders of the IRC for whatever reason, we'll just say that, and that - - - if that's the area you want to cure, then the remedy has got to focus on that entity and petitioners, or again, anyone, perhaps, could have sought relief in that way.

MR. TSEYTLIN: Your Honor, the violation here also curbed by the legislature, when it attempted to enact an unconstitutional map through - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Let's just - - - let's just - - -

MR. TSEYTLIN: - - - if I may - - -

JUDGE WILSON: Let's just hold onto that for a second. So what, in your view, should have happened when the IRC didn't submit a second plan? What's the next thing that should have happened?

MR. TSEYTLIN: The next thing that happens is 1 2 that - - -3 JUDGE WILSON: No, no. Should have happened. 4 MR. TSEYTLIN: The currently governing maps - - -5 the one adopted by the court in 2012 and the one adopted by 6 the legislature for the State Senate in 2012 are the 7 governing maps. Now, someone could sue under, I guess, 8 those maps, because they are malapportioned and 9 unconstitutional. If that lawsuit succeeds because they 10 are in fact malapportioned, then it becomes the Court's duty to draw the map. 11 12 But let's say the population hadn't moved. Let's 13 say that people were - - -14 JUDGE WILSON: Well, wait a minute. What about -15 - - what about Section 5? That is, doesn't a right of the 16 legislature spring upon judicial determination that a map 17 is invalid? 18 MR. TSEYTLIN: Well, Your Honor, I have two 19 answers for that. One is this just - - - Justice Curran 20 said below, the - - - the proximate provision to the 21 procedural requirement is the one that says the court draws 22 the map. 23 But in any event, even if Your Honor looks at 24 Section 5, you have to consider whether this a violation

that the legislature can cure. And here the legislature -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: Does it matter that the word "shall" have an opportunity? Does - - - does that verbiage matter - - -

MR. TSEYTLIN: Right, Your Honor - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - as to giving them a chance to fix it?

MR. TSEYTLIN: But sometimes, it is impossible for them to fix it, depending on what the violation is. In this circumstance, this was not a violation that they could possibly fix because the commission did not - - - did not have the deadline. And I just want to be clear - -

this. Let me - - - let me just - - - when you say there's no way the legislature could have cured this particular defect. So then the question is whether or not what they did - - - if we can disagree with you on that, and what they did is sufficient, and if indeed - - - again, I'd like you to address what I was asking about before. If the Constitution anticipates, you know, if they don't accept one plan from the IRC, that the IRC gets a chance to submit another plan. And they did in this case submit two plans.

And so the legislature has everything available to it that the Constitution otherwise would require. Why wouldn't this be, if there is a - - a - - some kind of



defect, a very technical defect, why can't the legislature 1 2 simply say, we not only looked at one plan, we looked at 3 two plans, we don't approve them, and under the 4 Constitution, we're not obligated to adopt them. We can 5 reject them and then proceed with our own plan. 6 Why isn't that an appropriate way to respond and 7 then all that happens is exactly, sort of, the rest of this 8 litigation, which is whatever the legislature comes up 9 If someone, who is a citizen, wants to challenge it 10 they can, and the courts will do what they usually do in these kinds of cases, determine that on the merits. 11 12 MR. TSEYLTIN: Your Honor, I have three answers 13 to that question. One, this is adversarial litigation; 14 that argument has been completely waived. 15 Number two, there - - - I - - - as I read the 16 17 commission submits has to be different from the first; 18 that's why it's second.

Constitution, the second set of maps, or the second map the

Third, even if I'm wrong - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: But wait a minute. Where does the Constitution say that?

> MR. TSEYTLIN: That I - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Where does it say that?

MR. TSEYTLIN: That I think is the fairest reading of the Constitution that the second set of maps,



1 after the first one is rejected, is different because - -2 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, let me ask you this. 3 always stood - - - I understood your argument to be that 4 the problem is they just didn't submit something by the 5 second deadline. And couldn't they have submitted one of 6 the other two plans that they had already submitted is your 7 position now? That they couldn't have submitted one of the 8 two plans that they submitted on the first round? 9 MR. TSEYTLIN: That - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: It has to be completely different from the other two? 11 12 MR. TSEYTLIN: That is not a position we've taken 13 in this litigation because this argument - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: No, but I'm asking you. Given the 15 argument you've just made, it seems to me that that is the 16 logical conclusion. That they could not even go back and 17 say, look, we were split on the two. Now we have a quorum 18 and a majority for one of these two; that's what we're 19 going to submit. As I understand your argument, they 20 couldn't even do that. They'd have to come up with 21 something completely different. 22 MR. TSEYTLIN: That argue - - - that is my 23 position standing here today, facing this argument for the 24 first time, because the first two maps were both submitted 25 by the legislature.

But I think there's a third argument that I would like to finish, Your Honor, which is that the Constitution specifically says that the second set of maps shall be voted on by the legislature. It simply didn't happen here. They didn't vote on that second - - - that second set of maps, even if Your Honor were to treat that as a constructive submission.

So as a result, even this new argument, which again, has been completely waived, very talented counsel, three to one, throughout this case, no one has raised that kind of argument. So I think that in adversarial litigation with respect that argument needs to be - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: So Counsel, why wouldn't we just send it - - it's a procedural violation; let's put aside the substantive for a moment. Why wouldn't we send it back to the legislature and say, okay, now vote on the original two maps? And if you reject them, then you can start this tail end of the process, which we can debate what that really means. But why isn't that the remedy?

MR. TSEYTLIN: Well, Your Honor, because the Constitution provides the remedy. And the sentence says that the process for redistricting established by this section shall govern redistricting in the state except to the extent that a court is required to order the adoption or the changes to a redistricting plan as a remedy of

1 violation of a law. So that's - - -2 JUDGE GARCIA: But that seems to be some conflict 3 with some leader language, I think it's 5 or 5-b, which 4 says that they get a chance to correct. 5 MR. TSEYTLIN: Well, so, Your Honor, I - - - I 6 resubmit my three arguments that I just made to Judge 7 Rivera, which is that this argument has been waived. Two, 8 I do believe that the maps have to be different because the 9 if the legislature - - -10 JUDGE GARCIA: No, not different. But why don't 11 we let them have a chance to - - - to finish under that 12 provision of the Constitution that says they get another 13 shot? 14 MR. TSEYTLIN: Well, the - - - the party that 15 needs to submit the maps to the legislature is the IRC and 16 the timeframe in the Constitution - - -17 JUDGE GARCIA: Now there's a judicial remedy and 18 we're saying, okay, this was bad, go back and do it again. 19 MR. TSEYTLIN: Well, Your Honor, I think that 20 would be a judicial amendment of the - - - of the 21 constitutional time frame, which is - - - which is elapsed 22 23 JUDGE GARCIA: So would be - - - so would be 24 sending it to a special master, right, so what's the 25 difference?



MR. TSEYTLIN: Well, no, absolutely not Your

Honor, the Constitution specifically says that the remedy

for a violation is the court adopting a redistricting plan

- - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Shouldn't the remedy match the error? Shouldn't it address the error?

MR. TSEYTLIN: The remedy should be the one the Constitution provides. There's only one remedy the Constitution provides for a process violation, which is the adoption or changes to a redistricting plan. Now, I just - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And you're saying the Constitution reads that the legislature is now cut out?

MR. TSEYTLIN: For the process violation. If we were to lose on the substance of - - - of - - - we lose it on the process and win on our substance violation, I do believe that the question the Court asks are exactly right on. It is - - the only argument they could possibly have on an affirmed finding of fact is - - is sufficiency of the evidence argument. They didn't properly frame one of those, and in fact there's no case, that we have been able to find or my friends have been able to find, in the history of the State of New York where an affirmed finding of fact was overturned based upon a disagreement between the experts - -



1	JUDGE WILSON: Counsel, I just want to make sure
2	I understand something. Maybe I misunderstood you, but if
3	you were to win on the substance, does the legislature get
4	another chance under 5?
5	MR. TSEYTLIN: If we lose on the procedure and
6	win on the substance
7	JUDGE WILSON: If you win on the substance
8	MR. TSEYTLIN: they have until April
9	30th
10	JUDGE WILSON: Well, why April 30th?
11	MR. TSEYTLIN: They told the Court of Appeals
12	that they in this legislation, this is not a statute
13	that's been discussed before Your Honors in this
14	legislation, there is a provision that says that any
15	decision by the trial court shall be tentative for thirty
16	days.
17	JUDGE WILSON: Um-hum.
18	MR. TSEYTLIN: And they said to the Court of
19	Appeals in seeking a stay, those are the thirty days that
20	we need, if we make a mistake, to fix what we did, to do
21	something new. So the Court of Appeals in granting the
22	stay and ultimately in an issuing not the Court of
23	Appeals, the Appellate Division in granting a stay
24	and ultimately it took them at their word, they said

JUDGE WILSON: So you're saying that modifies - -

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- that's an agreed-upon modification of - - - of the

provision Section 5 that springs upon judicial

determination of invalidity?

MR. TSEYTLIN: So the Section 5 remedy, which

allows legislature a reasonable opportunity to cure -
JUDGE WILSON: You say they've cabined that by

agreement.

MR. TSEYTLIN: They - - - they've told the courts, in fact, in seeking relief from the Appellate Division, what the reasonable period is, thirty days. Appellate Division took them at their word, gave them the thirty days; that thirty days expires here in a couple of days. They can surely do it that quickly.

In Maryland when the - - - when the map was struck down also based in large part on Mr. Trende's testimony, the court gave them, I believe, five business days, the Maryland General Assembly, and enacted a remedial map in four.

And then what happened in that case, and I was hoping that would happen here, after the two courts below had issued the decision, is the General Assembly in Maryland came together, passed the new map. The Governor Hogan of the other party signed it, everyone got rid of - - everyone agreed to end the case, and now there's fair maps in Maryland. That can happen very quickly.

But with the Chief Judge's permission, just so I'm clear, your interpretation of those two provisions is if it's a process violation, if the procedures set out for the IRC has been violated, then the court can send it to the special master, let's say, or take whatever action the court deems appropriate. If it's a substantive violation in terms of a purpose violation, then the legislature under Section 5 gets a chance to redraw?

MR. TSEYTLIN: A reasonable opportunity to cure, that's correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE GARCIA: Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

Counsel, your rebuttal?

MR. BUCKI: Yes, Your Honor.

I think this case goes back to the institutional argument that I started with. And Mr. Tseytlin makes clear his motivations over the purpose of his - - - over the course of his argument that, in fact, the objective of the petitioners is to try to push this task of map-making to a court and away from the legislature, because his clients are not able to achieve through the legislative process the desired outcome that they want.

And so rather than give effect to the voice of the people, as reflected by the legislature, who is elected



by the people of the entire state of New York, to instead wrest away that redistricting prerogative and put it in the hands of a judge who is elected by only one half of one percent of the people of the state of New York.

JUDGE SINGAS: Counselor - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: I'm sorry, go ahead - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: Prior to the adoption of these amendments, the legislature was saying something different. In fact, they were saying that they wanted to amend the Constitution to reform comprehensively the process, to establish a new and exclusive process by which new state legislative and congressional districts shall be drawn, that will ensure the drawing of legislative district lines in New York will be done by a bipartisan independent body. So who's abandoning the will of the people now?

MR. BUCKI: The commission did. The commission did its job at first; they submitted two maps at first.

And then when they had the second opportunity, the commission did not do its job. And under this Court's precedent in Cohen v. Cuomo, in a situation where there is a circumstance that's not anticipated by the text of the Constitution, we would submit that it is anticipated a fortiori because looking at Section 4(b) of Article III of the Constitution, it says, "if either house shall fail to approve the legislation implementing the second

redistricting plan," - - - that's what happened here 1 2 because there was no second redistricting plan, and so 3 there was nothing to approve. It doesn't say if either 4 house shall reject - - -5 JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel - - -6 MR. BUCKI: - - - it says failure to 7 approve - - -8 JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - that gets me back to the 9 remedy question that Judge Wilson was probing before. 10 there nothing anyone could have done when the IRC process was becoming derailed to compel them to act in accordance 11 12 with their constitutional mandate? 13 Or - - - or was this thing just supposed to 14 completely - - - to - - - to torture the railroad analogy, 15 what it supposed to just completely go off the rails and 16 there's nothing anyone could have done about it? 17

MR. BUCKI: I suppose that there could have been a lawsuit brought by petitioners against the - - - against the members of the commission but the - - - the time passed. And we would submit that in that situation the ability to redistrict on the part of the legislature never went away because the commission was there to give recommendations. This is not a state like Arizona, for example, whereby the actual power to impose a redistricting

map is placed with a commission that is separate and apart

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from the legislature and the commission's determinations are binding.

Here, we had in New York State a commission that was entirely advisory. And any kind of map that may have some from that commission the legislature was entirely free to reject. And when the commission did not do its job, then we would submit that, as has always existed for two centuries, the prerogative of the legislature to impose that redistricting - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Or perhaps, Counsel - -
CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: - - - and when the

commission didn't perform their job, what recourse, if any,

did the legislature have?

MR. BUCKI: The legislature's recourse was to go ahead and propose a new map and enact a new map. And that's perfectly consistent with the language, number one, of Article III, Section 4(b), because neither house was able to approve a new map. And second of all, inasmuch as it can be determined that - - that the Constitution is not simply on point with respect to what happens when there is a failure on the part of the commission - - not a failure by the legislature, a failure by the commission to do its job - - then - - then it was the prerogative of the legislature to enact a map, and that's exactly what the legislature - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But, Counsel, why - - - why if - - - I'm on the screen. Why - - - why isn't your adversary correct, that what happens in that situation is that the existing maps stay in place, and of course someone could challenge them if they wish to, to say that they are malapportioned?

MR. BUCKI: Well, there's - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: To argue that they're malapportioned? Why - - - why isn't that the way it should work? Why isn't he right about that?

MR. BUCKI: Well, with respect to the congressional map, there was no way that those maps could remain in place because there was a reduction in one seat of representation in congress. And so with respect to the judicial remedy that Mr. Tseytlin speaks so highly of, I think that question is answered by Section 4(e) of Article III of the Constitution, which says that this process shall govern redistricting in this state except to the extent that a court is required to order the adoption of or changes to a redistricting plan as a remedy for a violation of law.

And we would submit that there was no such requirement here because the legislature acted. And as this Court noted only thirty five days ago, judges may not arbitrarily supplant the legislature's reasoned



determinations with their own judgements or notions of common sense under the guise of constitutional interpretation. And that's precisely the same case that we have here again, because the legislature balanced all of these required factors under Article III Section 4(c)(5) of the Constitution. And maybe the petitioners would have drawn the map a little differently; maybe someone from a think tank or from an editorial board of a newspaper would have drawn these maps differently, or somebody on Twitter might have drawn these maps differently. But the fact is they are not the legislature and they are not elected by the people, and that's why all these maps should be upheld.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

Counsel?

MR. HECKER: Your Honor, we're - - - we're - - - we're glossing over the language of the Constitution. Mr. Tseytlin purposefully omits, when he reads from Section 4(e), the words - - and Section 5, which are incorporated expressly into 4(e) and used the word "any" twice. Is this any judicial proceeding relating to redistricting, and is this - - are we talking about any law establishing congressional or state legislative districts?

Because if we are, the legislature gets the opportunity not to present a plan to the special master to correct, unilaterally, its infirmities. And if that's



incorporated into 4(e), then it's impossible to conclude at all, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt, that it unambiguously extinguishes the legislative authority, even though when the League of Women Voters was urging a decade ago that this state do what Colorado and Arizona and Michigan did, which is give the commission sole authority to enact, the voters didn't do that, and the legislature, which is the ones that proposed the 2014 amendments, didn't do that. They're purely advisory.

I want to come back to the substantive point and - - and make what I think is a critical observation about what's going to come next if this Court accepts petitioner's invitation to be the first court in history to ever strike down a redistricting plan without paying attention on a district-by-district basis to what the justifications are and whether they are persuasive and, if not, why not. What is the legislature supposed to do, whether it's in a few days or an extended period time, for example, with district 11?

We have put into the - - - into the record unrebutted evidence that adjoining district 10 was drawn the way it was in order to reunite the Chinese-American community that had become cracked. And as a result, it just so happens that district 11 had the composition of its partisanship changed.

If this court strikes down, as the trial court and the appellate court did, the plan without telling us anything about which districts are infirm and why, what are we supposed to do with district 11? In the absence of a specific judicial order, are we supposed to go back and purposefully re-crack the Chinese-American community for the sole purpose of rendering the adjoining Staten Island district more Republican?

That would be deeply problematic, and that's why courts don't do that. The Florida court, where the process was so dramatically more - - - more problematic than it was here, noted the extremely serious process failures and then went through innumerous opinions, innumerous rounds of litigation, district by district, and said, here's the problem, and by the way upheld almost all the districts in the end. And the couple that were struck down, there were specific instructions, and the legislature fixed it.

The - - - the - - - the - - - this gets back to the problem with Mr. Trende's methodology. It's literally incapable - - - forget about accounting for communities of interest, which explains all the deltas in all of his bands. It doesn't even tell us which districts we're talking about. In his singularly important dot plot chart, those districts aren't the districts. They are the order districts in which his simulations come up most often. We

1 don't even know for sure what the first four districts are 2 or what the next nine are, and I just would 3 respectfully - - -4 JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, just to be clear, no 5 one moved to preclude Mr. Trende's analysis on the grounds 6 that it was methodologically deficient or anything like 7 that, did they? 8 MR. HECKER: Correct. But we expressly 9 acquiesced in his testimony, subject to cross-examination. 10 That's literally what was said on the record. And then we 11 cross-examined him and showed him to be - - - his 12 methodology to be worthless. This was a bench trial that 13 happened very quickly. There was no expert discovery. The 14 court said on the record, I want the experts to come so I 15 can see who's gotten it right and who hasn't. And 16 everybody testified, and everybody got cross-examined. 17 I would respectfully suggest that it would be

deeply problematic to strike down a state-wide redistricting statute, you know, notwithstanding all of the evidence of the methodological failures, because there wasn't some kind of foundational objection that - - - that wouldn't have been appropriate under the circumstances.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. HECKER: Thank you.

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CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?



MR. LANG: On the issue of the standard of review, I mean, petitioners again say these are firm findings of fact, but I would just remind the Court you're not writing on a blank slate here. I mean, there are three redistricting cases, Matter of Sherrill, Schneider v.

Rockefeller, Wolpoff v. Cuomo, and in none of those - - - and those cases did involve review of what could be called factual issues like the compactness of the districts, contiguity of the districts. And in none of those cases did this Court suggest that there was anything other than a conclusion of law that was at stake, nor - - nor did this Court view it even as a sufficiency of the evidence, although I agree that would be preferable to - - to - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, Counsel, do you agree that any action this court takes would have to be premised on a district-by-district analysis, no matter what the constitutional districting violation might be? So whatever the purpose overall - - - this Court, I hear, like, unlike any other court in history, we would not have the authority to strike a map. Do you agree with that?

MR. LANG: Well, I - - - I mean, I think it could - - it could potentially depend. I mean, it's very difficult unless you have a district-by-district finding.

I mean, I - - - you know - - - this isn't - - - this isn't an argument that the Governor's made, but I understand the

problem; it makes it very difficult to cure unless you go district-by-district because you have this issue of communities of interest. And - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: And I suppose that also depends on where we sent it, right? Because if we sent it to a special master, then you wouldn't really have that problem, to draw a new map?

MR. LANG: Well, I mean, I suppose unless you know which districts are invalid - - - I mean, as I understand, what petitioner wants is that a new map needs to be drawn up from scratch.

I - - - I want to briefly address the procedural issue and - - - and, you know, just two quick points on that. I mean, one is that even if there a - - - if there's any way to reconcile the Constitution with the 2021 legislation, then it should be done. So even if what petitioner is arguing is a possible argument, it shouldn't carry the day.

I think a more reasonable reading of the state constitutional procedures, when you look at the issue in context, and in the context of the legislature's historic redistricting authority that was not changed with the 2014 amendments, the legislature retained an enormous amount of authority under the 2014 amendments, that the legislature appropriately stepped in here. And again, there's a big



difference between when the problem is - - - when the

legislature is the source of the problem, then - - - then

maybe you - - - you - - - your only option is that a court

is required to step in.

But that's simply not what happened here. The

IRC was prevented from forming a quorum, so we couldn't

even submit a competing set of maps, so the legislature

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel.

acted within its rights in stepping in and drawing maps.

Counsel?

MR. TSEYTLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. The process the 2014 amendment sets out is for the enactment of new maps. And it is a legal predicate for the legislature to do what it did before, which is bicamerals and present.

If the - - - if the process fails, then the old maps are in place, unless somebody brings a lawsuit.

Someone brings a lawsuit, court draws the map. That resolves all of the concerns about how to structure the remedy. Now, in terms of the timing - - -

JUDGE WILSON: How do you - - - how do you keep the old map for the congressional districts in place when you don't have as many congressional districts?

MR. TSEYTLIN: Well, somebody would need to sue, and we did sue. And it's very important that in our lawsuit we challenged not only the new maps, we challenged



the old maps, because we recognized that those were malapportioned, had the wrong number of districts.

So we did that here, we did that job here, and I would respectfully submit, given the stakes of redistricting, how many people are impacted, you're always going to have a lawsuit. But the way that the structure works is that you just can't enact - - there's no requirement - - let's say you had a really static decade and people didn't move around, especially in the state legislature - - in the state assembly and the state senate where you didn't need to redraw it.

If the process failed, then the maps from the prior decennial would just control. There's really no - - really no problem there. If there's people moving, you're always going to have a lawsuit because of the stakes involved. And that - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But that does, Counsel - - - I'm on the - - - I'm on the screen. But that does seem to be not really what the Constitution is - - - is attempting to do. Because again they are correct; you can't deny that. They are correct that the IRC - - - the Constitution doesn't mandate that the IRC plan or plans be adopted. It is always the legislature's province to reject or approve the plans. And if they don't, then they can pass their own.

I'm, again, having difficulty with your argument that you're driving the substantive work of drawing district lines into a judicial forum when it's very clear that the legislature doesn't have to adopt what the IRC proposes. And the legislature gets to cure any infirmities with - - with the legislation or with the process.

I'm - - - I'm having great difficulty with - - - with this argument that you are making that throws it to the court. And by the way, when you said it just goes to the court and then the court fashions its remedy, again the Constitution makes it very clear that the legislature has to have an opportunity to address those district lines that you claim have - - are violating the Constitution in the way they've been drawn.

MR. TSEYTLIN: May I answer?

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, please.

MR. TSEYTLIN: The - - - as the League of Women

Voters explained, the - - - the judicial backstop, which is

the only remedy of judicial violation, derives the

compromise. If the legislature knows that it appoints IRC

commissioners that will not do their job, they will do a

good job appointing commissioners that will compromise.

If this honor - - - if Your Honors accept the arguments by our friends, the IRC is over. The legislature will never bother appointing commissioners again, or



they'll appoint people whose only job will to be to 1 deadlock the thing. If however this Court does what - - -2 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Or, Counsel, it could very well be 4 that the people of the state of New York will recognize 5 that their attempt to provide a way to address 6 gerrymandering, and other problems that the people of the 7 state of New York may view as somehow embedded in the 8 current process, requires a true independent IRC. 9 one that is not merely recommending plans but is actually 10 deciding what the lines should be. MR. TSEYTLIN: May I, Your Honor? 11 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Please. 13 MR. TSEYTLIN: The people in 2021 were asked by 14 15

MR. TSEYTLIN: The people in 2021 were asked by the legislature, with a constitutional amendment, can we do this very thing? If the IRC fails, can we enact a map?

They put it on a constitutional amendment. The people said no. It would be a grave insult to the people to tell them that their votes in 2021 - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel - - -

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MR. TSEYTLIN: - - - were entirely irrelevant.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, even going back to 2014, it seemed to me, looking at the debate, that there was a position that said, don't vote for this by certain good government groups because it's sham reform or it's - - - and then there were some other groups that said, no, this

1	is real. So it seems the people believe this was real			
2	reform at the time. So we would be telling them at this			
3	point that no, it wasn't.			
4	MR. TSEYTLIN: Absolutely, Your Honor. Thank			
5	you.			
6	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Please. Thank you.			
7	(Court is adjourned)			
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